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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: This paper analyses the type and pace of organisational change expected in the 
Maltese budgetary framework. Drawing on the Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model, the 
paper provides an examination of the internal dynamics surrounding the budgetary 
framework in Malta, including stakeholders’ dissatisfaction, value commitments, power 
dependencies and capacity for action. The paper explores the different categories of 
performance budgeting systems (presentational, performance-informed and direct) and their 
bearing on the different levels of change. 
Design/methodology/approach: The study follows a qualitative approach using data 
gathered from documentary sources, corroborated with empirical evidence collected from in-
depth, semi-structured interviews. The interviews comprised open-ended questions and they 
were conducted with senior politicians from the government and the opposition, including 
former ministers and Prime Ministers, and with senior civil servants. 
Findings: The findings indicate that a radical change to the existing Maltese budgeting 
system could be problematic, as the current system is an institutionalised practice and 
change could be resisted by the parties affected by the reform. The findings suggest that, 
within the Maltese scenario, the political ability required to make reforms happen is a further 
enabler of radical change. 
Originality/value: The paper provides an analysis of the expected change in the budgetary 
framework of a small EU country, identifying the enabling elements of such a change. The 
method of analysis could be extended to other countries which intend to embark on budgetary 
reforms. The study also assesses the relevant issues from a policy-making perspective, 
through access to senior politicians as policy makers, and senior civil servants who influence 
policy makers and are responsible for implementing policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A traditional line-item budgeting system has been in operation within the Maltese 
public administration for many years. The resilience of this system has been the 
result of the strong advocacy by budget offices and ministries of finance for the 
control of public funds. Notwithstanding its endurance, this system embodies certain 
limitations which impede effective planning and decision-making, and limit 
performance-oriented accountability. Budgetary reforms seek to remedy the 
deficiencies embedded in line-item budgeting. By concentrating on the performance 
dimension in resource allocation decisions, performance-based budgeting (PBB) is 
aimed at achieving operational efficiency and enhancing accountability for the 
results attained (Shah and Shen, 2007). The Government in Malta is committed to 
controlling its fiscal deficit and the government debt, in order to ensure sustainable 
public finances and to comply with EU regulations. In this scenario, performance 
measurement assumes greater importance, with PBB having the potential to be used 
as a financial management tool to indicate which government programmes are 
ineffective or under-performing.   
 
This paper seeks to explain the type and pace of organisational change expected in 
the Maltese budgetary framework. In this regard, the paper draws upon the 
Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model, providing an examination of the internal 
dynamics surrounding the budgetary framework in Malta. The paper also reflects on 
the different categories of PBB systems (presentational, performance-informed and 
direct) and their bearing on the different levels of change (radical versus convergent 
change and evolutionary versus revolutionary change). The paper contributes to 
existing literature as follows: first, it provides an analysis of the expected change in 
the budgetary framework of a small EU country, identifying the enabling elements of 
such a change. The method of analysis could be extended to other countries which 
intend to embark on budgetary change. Secondly, the study provides an analysis of 
the relevant issues from a policy-making perspective, through access to senior 
politicians as policy makers, and senior civil servants who influence policy makers 
and are responsible for implementing policy.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
PBB has been defined by the OECD (2008, p. 2) as “budgeting that links the funds 
allocated to measurable results”. This system provides information in the budget 
document which explains what the organisation or department has achieved or 
expects to do with the funds at its disposal (Melkers and Willoughby, 1998).  
 
Budgetary reforms seek to address the shortcomings of traditional line-item 
budgeting systems. The line-item budget focuses on how much money is spent and 
on whether expense items have increased or declined in comparison with the 
previous year’s budget (Shah and Shen, 2007). This budgeting system makes it 
difficult to assess the performance of government programmes and to appraise the 
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quality of service delivered by public officials (Murray and Efendioglu, 2011). 
Murray and Efendioglu (2011) remark that line-item budgeting is especially 
ineffective during times of fiscal turbulence. When resources are going to be limited, 
equal across-the-board cuts are typical in a line-item budgeting system, rather than 
decreasing resource allocation for ineffective or inefficient programmes (Jogiste, 
Peda and Grossi, 2012).   
 
Unlike the conventional line-item budget, a performance budget comprises 
performance information (PI) on each government programme, thus facilitating the 
public officials’ task of providing information to the public about the programmes 
being undertaken and obtaining the public’s support for government’s activities 
(Shah and Shen, 2007). McGeough (2014) argued that PI plays a critical role in 
discharging accountability for performance, as the public administration attempts to 
justify the utilisation of public funds and to respond to criticisms of poor 
performance.  
 
OECD (2007) categorizes PBB into three types: presentational, performance-
informed and direct. In presentational PBB, the PI presented in budget documents 
does not play a role in decision-making and does not affect the way in which 
resources are allocated. PI is included as background information for the purposes of 
accountability and dialogue with legislators and citizens, on public policy issues and 
government direction. In performance-informed budgeting, the PI may assist 
decision-making, but does not determine the amount of resources allocated. Direct 
PBB involves allocating resources based on results achieved. Appropriations are 
based on a formula/contract with specific performance or activity indicators, and 
funding is directly based on results achieved. The PBB categories proposed by the 
OECD are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Performance budgeting categories 
Performance budgeting categories  
Type Linkage between 
performance information 
and funding 
Main purpose in the 
budget process 
Presentational No link Accountability 
Performance-informed 
budgeting 
Loose/indirect link Planning and/or 
accountability 
Direct performance 
budgeting 
 
Tight/direct link Resource allocation and 
accountability 
Source: OECD (2007, p. 21) 
 
The OECD 2011/2012 Performance Budgeting Survey (von Trapp, 2014), which 
covered thirty-one OECD member countries and the Russian Federation, found that 
PBB practices are widely used but vary considerably between countries. The survey 
results indicated that PI is useful for accountability purposes, but not so much for 
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resource allocation. In effect, the resource allocation process remains a political 
procedure. Thus, there is only a loose/indirect link between PI and funding decisions.  
 
There is some contrasting evidence showing that PI is used actively in decision 
making. Askim (2007) found that local councillors in Norway use PI actively. 
Similarly, Liguori, Sicilia, and Steccolini (2012), who studied Italian municipalities, 
showed that PI played an important role in politicians’ decision-making. A 
comparable situation was observed by Bjornholt and Houlberg (2013) in Danish 
municipalities.  
 
The Maltese government is seeking to keep the fiscal deficit under control and to 
lower government debt, in order to ensure adherence to EU regulations. Malta was 
placed under an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) by the EU, between June 2013 
and June 2015, because the fiscal deficit was above the 3% of GDP threshold at the 
end of 2012 (European Council, 2013). The EDP against Malta was eventually lifted 
since government managed to lower the fiscal deficit (European Council, 2015); 
however, the EU has indicated a number of sectors which require reform (including 
health care, energy and pensions) in order for Malta to ensure long term fiscal 
sustainability (European Commission, 2015). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model of organisational change is used to explain 
the type and pace of organisational change that may be expected in the Maltese 
public sector for the implementation of budgetary reform. This model has been 
drawn upon by Argento and Van Helden (2009; 2010) to explain reforms in the 
water sector in the Netherlands and in Italy.  
 
The model is used here to establish whether a radical change is possible in the 
Maltese budgetary framework and to identify the factors that would enable or hinder 
such a change. The model proposes a framework for understanding organisational 
change from the perspective of neo-institutional theory. The authors seek to explain 
why a radical change takes place and the incidence and pace by which such change 
occurs. The authors determine that a major source of organisational resistance to 
change originates from the premise that an organisation is normatively embedded in 
its institutional context. They suggest that the incidence and pace of radical change 
vary because of differences in organisations’ internal dynamics (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996, p. 1023). Therefore, these internal dynamics determine whether 
organisations undergo radical change and, if they do, how quickly. Focus is placed 
by the authors upon four aspects of an organization's internal dynamics - interests, 
values, power dependencies and capacity for action.  
 
The model establishes two aspects of organisational change: convergent versus 
radical change and revolutionary versus evolutionary change. Radical organisational 
change involves the transformation of the organisation, whilst convergent change 
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refers to the fine tuning of its existing orientation; revolutionary change occurs 
quickly and impacts practically all parts of the organisation concurrently, whereas 
evolutionary change takes place slowly and gradually. 
 
Argento and van Helden (2010, p. 793) observe that institutionalisation can be an 
obstacle to change because rules and practices in an organisation become part of the 
way things are, that is, they become deeply embedded in an organisation. However, 
the response of the individual organisation to institutional pressures is a function of 
the organisation’s internal dynamics, and thus, the role of intraorganisational 
dynamics is critical in accepting or rejecting institutionalised practices. 
 
The model includes exogenous dynamics (market context and institutional context) 
and endogenous dynamics (interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for 
action). The authors classify the endogenous elements of the model into 
‘precipitating dynamics’ and ‘enabling dynamics’. 
 
On ‘precipitating dynamics’, the authors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1033-
1037) observe that pressures for change within an organisation derive from ‘interest 
dissatisfaction’ and the ‘pattern of value commitments’. Dissatisfaction will only 
lead to radical change if the dissatisfied stakeholders link their position of 
disadvantage to the existing template (way of doing things), and there is the 
possibility of an alternative template. The critical factor leading to the possibility of 
radical change and providing the direction for change is the pattern of value 
commitments within the organisation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The authors 
identify four patterns of value commitments: status quo (where all stakeholders are 
committed to the existing institutionalised template-in-use); indifferent (groups are 
neither committed nor opposed to the template-in-use); competitive (some groups 
support the template-in-use, others prefer an alternative template); and reformative 
(all stakeholders are opposed to the template-in-use and prefer an alternative).  
 
Reform is only possible if stakeholder dissatisfaction is coupled with a competitive 
or reformative pattern of value commitments: 
 
“Radical change will only occur if interests become associated with a competitive or 
reformative pattern of value commitment … Otherwise, interest dissatisfaction will 
precipitate convergent change.” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1036-1037) 
 
As regards the pace of change, the authors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1037) 
claim that a reformative commitment triggers revolutionary change because of the 
lack of resistance, whilst a competitive commitment will lead to evolutionary change 
in view of the resistance encountered from certain groups. 
 
On ‘enabling dynamics’, the authors (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 1037) 
identify ‘power dependencies’ and ‘capacity for action’ as the enablers of radical 
change. 
 Understanding the Type and Pace of Organisational Change  
in the Maltese Budgetary Framework 
 80  
 
 
Power dependencies either enable or suppress radical change within an organisation 
– radical change takes place where the power dependencies are combined with a 
reformative or competitive pattern of value commitments (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996, p. 1039). Where the pattern of commitment is competitive (and therefore there 
are divergent views on the proposed change), radical change will only happen if the 
people in positions of power are in favour of the proposed change (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996, p. 1038). 
 
Capacity for action is the ability of making the transition from the existing template 
to an alternative template. It requires the organisation’s understanding of the new 
template, having the competencies to function with the new template and having the 
ability to manage the transition to the new destination (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996, p. 1040). In the absence of capacity for action, radical change will not happen; 
furthermore, “capacity for action has to be combined with either a reformative or 
competitive pattern of value commitments” (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, p. 
1040).  
 
The foregoing literature review and theoretical framework give rise to the following 
research question: What type of organisational change is expected in the Maltese 
budgetary framework? What type of PBB should be adopted within the Maltese 
context and how does this affect the different levels of change (radical versus 
convergent and evolutionary versus evolutionary)? 
 
4. Research Design and Methods 
 
A qualitative approach was embraced using data gathered from documentary 
sources, corroborated with empirical evidence collected from in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. The triangulation of documentary sources against oral sources 
provides a more reliable account of an event or situation (Gidley, 2004). 
Documentary sources facilitated the formulation of the theoretical framework and 
guided the compilation of the research instrument used to gather primary data. 
Qualitative interviews were considered appropriate for the research in order to seek 
to understand the reasons underlying the participants’ opinions and attitudes.  
 
The interviews comprised open-ended questions, whereby interviewees were 
encouraged to talk about a particular topic or issue, depending on their individual 
expertise and experience. Interviews were carried out with twenty-eight respondents, 
as detailed in Figure 1. The selection of the research participants was made on the 
basis of their present or past involvement in the annual budgetary process and/or on 
the basis of their experience in public financial management.  
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Figure 1. Research participants  
 
1. Former Prime Minister (2004-2013), Former Minister for Social Policy (1998-2004) 
2. Former Prime Minister (1996-1998), presently a Member of the European Parliament  
3. Former Minister for Finance (2008-2013), Former Parliamentary Secretary in the 
Ministry for Finance (2004-2008), presently Member of Parliament and Chairman of 
the Public Accounts Committee 
4. Former Minister for Finance (1992–1996, 1998–2004), Former Minister of Economic 
Affairs (1990–92), Former Minister for Social Policy including the Health portfolio 
(2008-2010), European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy (2010–2012) 
5. Economist and Academic  
6. Economist and Advisor to Government 
7. Former Director General at the Budget Office 
  
Mr Saviour Gauci, Former Director General at the Budget Office 
Senior politicians and 
economists: 
Possess a wealth of 
knowledge and experience 
through their involvement 
in the Maltese public 
administration, in 
particular the country’s 
financial management 
including the budgetary 
framework 
  
  
 
 
 
8. The Minister for Finance (2013 to date); Professor of Economics 
9. A senior civil servant at the Ministry for Finance 
10. Professor of Public Policy at the University of Hull; Advisor to the Ministry for 
Finance in Malta 
11. The Budget Office 
12. A Director at the Economic Policy Department 
13. The Accountant General 
  
  
Ministry for Finance: 
Responsible for leading the 
budgetary preparation and 
execution process 
Ministries for Education 
and Health:  
Represent the largest two 
spending ministries; 
involved in the compilation 
of business plans which 
feed into government’s 
annual budget 
 
20. Manager at the National Statistics Office 
21. The Auditor General 
22. The Deputy Auditor General 
23. The Assistant Auditor General 
24. The Permanent Secretary within the Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local 
Government; Lecturer at the University of Malta in Higher Diploma in Public Sector 
Accounting and Finance  
25. A Director General at the Central Bank of Malta 
26. A Director, Corporate Services at the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity 
  
Stakeholders: 
Actors which may affect 
the reform process  
 
27. The Prime Minister  
28. The Permanent Secretary within the Office of the Prime Minister 
  
Reform promoters: 
Have the power to initiate 
and enforce a reform 
 
 
 
14. The Minister for Education 
15. The Permanent Secretary at the Ministry for Education 
16. A Director, Corporate Services at the Ministry for Education 
17. A Director for Finance and Administration at the Ministry for Health 
18. A Director for the Directorate for Health Information and Research 
19. The Quality Systems Coordinator at the Ministry for Health 
  
  
 
Source: Author. 
 
It was considered important to target senior politicians, being policy makers, as well 
as senior civil servants who influence the policy makers and are responsible for 
implementing policies. In this respect, access was obtained to discuss relevant issues 
with people in prominent positions including the Prime Minister, Ministers, former 
Prime Ministers and Ministers, and senior civil servants. These interviewees can be 
termed an ‘elite population’, in view of their closeness to power and policy making 
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(Lilleker, 2003). Mikecz (2012) refers to an elite population as authority-bearing 
persons holding positions of power. The interviews were held between August 2014 
and April 2015, at the offices of the participants.  
 
The analysis of the data underlying the research was carried out using a thematic 
approach. The first phase of the thematic analysis undertaken was to develop 
familiarity with the data. In this regard, ‘analysis’ has been referred to as developing 
a close engagement with the data gathered (Bazeley, 2013). The fact that the 
interviews were transcribed by the researcher facilitated the attainment of this 
familiarity. Upon completion of the transcription process, the documented text was 
read repeatedly and thoroughly, with thoughts and ideas about codes and themes 
being noted. The next phase involved generating initial codes for the purpose of 
categorising the data comprised in the transcripts. Subsequently themes were 
identified. The themes identified were both ‘theory-driven’ and ‘data-driven’. The 
‘umbrella’ themes, which encapsulate the main points in the data set, were 
determined on the basis of the research questions and the theoretical underpinnings. 
However, the sub-themes emerged from a review of the data gathered. This was then 
followed by an exploration of the themes, in order to interpret the data and 
understand what is being revealed. The analysis sought to integrate the empirical 
data with the theoretical framework proposed and the literature reviewed at the start 
of the study (Wertz et al., 2011). This helped to determine what is significant about 
the study and what new contributions the study makes towards the existing literature. 
 
5. Findings  
 
This section seeks to determine the type of change expected in the Maltese budgetary 
framework, using the Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model as a basis for analysis. 
According to the authors, radical change could be problematic where a 
practice/system is deeply embedded in its institutional context, as is the case with the 
existing Maltese line-item budgeting system. The response of the Maltese public 
administration to the pressures for change will be analysed through an examination 
of the internal dynamics surrounding the budgetary framework. This section will 
also consider the respondents’ views regarding the type of PBB that should be 
introduced in the Maltese context. The choice of the PBB system will impinge on 
whether a radical versus a convergent change will be embraced.  
 
5.1 Diverging Levels of Stakeholders’ Dissatisfaction with the Current System 
 
The empirical data shows that there are, mainly, two groups of stakeholders which 
can be distinguished with respect to their diverging level of dissatisfaction with the 
existing line-item budgeting system. The first group, consisting of the majority of the 
research participants, believe that the existing budgetary system needs to undergo 
complete reform. It was claimed by an economist and advisor to government that the 
existing line-item, expenditure based budget, is out-dated. The interviewee stated 
that:  
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“There is no measure of efficiency and furthermore, there is no time for such 
considerations because the budget is prepared and finalized in a short 
timeframe…Very close to the budget date, the civil service first allocates the 
required resources for the implementation of government’s policies and priorities 
and then, the remaining funds are spread between the ministries (giving them a 
small portion of what was initially requested by them) – the latter allocation is done 
irrespective of value for money concepts.” 
 
The respondent expressed his wish to see a different approach to the budget process 
– ideally, the budget should pass through Cabinet in the first quarter of the year; the 
Cabinet makes the required decisions; then, within that framework of decision-
making, the civil service would implement Cabinet’s decisions and incorporate them 
within the budget (rather than having the civil service implementing mathematical 
decisions). The involvement of the Ministers at an early stage in the budget process 
would ensure that they understand the nature of government’s constraints, refraining 
from making unrealistic demands for funds.  
 
A few participants mentioned that budget allocations are done irrespective of value 
for money concepts, since no analysis is carried out as to what an activity is costing 
in terms of its expected outcomes (Jogiste et al., 2012). Two former Finance 
Ministers mentioned that the business plans presented by the line ministries are not 
measured in terms of the objectives expected to be achieved. One of the former 
Finance Ministers stated that: 
 
“When line ministries submit their business plans in support of their funding 
requests, they do not present any output indicators. Unfortunately, the ministries 
expect that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) will accept all the requests for funding, 
without having carried out a detailed analysis of the outputs and outcomes to be 
delivered through the inputs, without having ascertained what their priorities are 
and without having identified where efficiency gains can be made.” 
 
The second group of stakeholders, consisting of a Budget Office official and the 
MOF senior civil servant, demonstrated a much lower level of dissatisfaction with 
the current budgeting system itself. The former mentioned that some budget reforms 
have already been implemented recently, adding that there might be the need for 
further small improvements. The respondent did not envisage the need for a radical 
change in the Maltese budgetary system. 
 
The senior civil servant within the MOF attributed the problems in the country’s 
public finance to the policies being employed by government in the high spending 
sectors, including education, health, social welfare (inclusive of pensions), and the 
care of old people. Communicating a feeling of frustration, the respondent claimed 
that changes are required in respect of policy stances in these areas, rather than the 
budgetary framework. According to the respondent: 
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“It is not the way the budget process is carried out which is driving the expenditure; 
it is the policies that government is employing in these policy areas which are 
affecting the spending. The issue is that in these sectors, as long as the same policy 
stances remain, there is not much latitude for expenditure cutting, because the 
pensions, social benefits and salaries have to be paid, and free healthcare and 
education have to be provided.” 
 
Though the interviewee is clearly concerned with the increasing government 
expenditure, which is not always being adequately compensated by the increase in 
revenue generation, the statements made imply that this participant does not see the 
need for a reform in the budgeting process since such reform would not be sufficient 
to address financial sustainability.  
 
Care has to be exercised when analysing the comments made by the second group of 
stakeholders – these respondents are public officials from the MOF who are heavily 
involved in the decision-making underlying the budgetary process. Therefore, it is 
understandable that they might be reluctant to criticize the current budgeting system, 
to which they are significant contributors.  
 
The strong dissatisfaction with the current budgeting system, expressed by the first 
group of stakeholders, can be considered a stimulus for radical change. Nevertheless, 
given the influential position of the MOF representatives, their diverging views can 
give rise to an element of resistance to change. This can possibly be managed and 
controlled, depending on the significance of the other intraorganisational dynamics 
comprised in the model, as discussed below. 
 
5.2 Preference for the Existing versus the Alternative System 
 
Argento and van Helden (2009) advise that dissatisfaction does not automatically 
provide an alternative option. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) maintain that radical 
change will only occur if the dissatisfied stakeholders link the problems being faced 
to the existing system, and there is the possibility of an alternative template. The 
above discussion shows that the first group of stakeholders believe that the current 
system needs to be reinvented, since it is not adequately serving its purpose as a tool 
for effective decision making. The findings demonstrate that there is the possibility 
of an alternative system – a large number of participants from the first group of 
stakeholders referred to the usefulness of moving towards a PBB system, which 
would allow for the measurement of efficiency and effectiveness in government’s 
programmes. When asked whether the budgetary reform should be introduced, the 
following replies were given by diverse respondents: 
 
“Yes, absolutely”; “PBB is the only way forward, even because the EU Commission 
is pressing us to go that way”; “this is a vital tool for the country”; “at the end of 
the day, it is not the amount invested, but the results obtained that count”. 
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In accordance with the model, a significant factor which may give rise to reform is 
the pattern of value commitments. Radical change is only possible if stakeholder 
dissatisfaction is complemented by a competitive or reformative pattern of value 
commitments. The findings and the foregoing discussion suggest a competitive 
commitment, whereby the first group of stakeholders expressed their wish to see an 
alternative system, whilst the second group were not against the template-in-use. 
Though the second group of stakeholders did not criticize the existing system, they 
were aware of the need to control government spending and the country’s fiscal 
deficit by being more effective and efficient.  
 
5.3 Does the Budgetary Reform Have Support at the Top? 
 
Power dependencies have been identified by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) as 
enablers of radical change. Where there are divergent views on the proposed reform 
as is the case with the implementation of PBB in the Maltese scenario, radical 
change will only be possible if those in positions of power support the proposed 
change. This observation was substantiated by the interviewees, who claimed that 
political support will push the reform to happen and will ensure that it is carried out 
faster from a timing perspective. McGeough (2014) suggests that when PBB is in 
operation, political drive is also fundamental to stimulate the use of PI and the 
development of performance targets. 
 
A number of interview respondents who hold powerful positions appeared to be 
supportive of budgetary reform implementation. The Prime Minister, who is the head 
of the public service and who arguably holds the most powerful position in the 
public administration, stated the following when asked whether PBB should be 
introduced: “yes, an unqualified yes…” Nevertheless, the findings also show that the 
respondent is very cautious of changing the current system, given that this system is 
an institutionalised practice which has worked and served the country for years.     
 
The findings suggest that the key people holding positions of power have diverging 
views with respect to the implementation of the reform, with some of them being 
strongly in favour of the change and others having some reservations. The 
occurrence of radical change depends on whether those powerful people in favour of 
the budgetary reform are in a position to exert enough influence on government to 
ensure that the change is embarked on. The support and championing of the reform 
by the Prime Minister and by the MOF is likely to be fundamental for the change to 
happen.  
 
5.4 Capacity for Action 
 
Another enabler of radical change is capacity for action, which is the ability of 
transitioning from the existing system to the alternative system. The Greenwood and 
Hinings’ framework (1996) proposes that if capacity for action is supported by a 
competitive pattern of value commitments (as is the case in the Maltese scenario), 
 Understanding the Type and Pace of Organisational Change  
in the Maltese Budgetary Framework 
 86  
 
 
radical change would be possible. The findings indicate that the competencies 
required to operate within the new system might be lacking, in view of the limited 
number of adequately qualified public officials in government employment. In this 
regard, a Budget Office official observed that: 
 
“Finding the right people to champion PBB in the line ministries could be quite 
challenging. This is due to the existing limited human resources in the public sector; 
the employee turnover within the ministries/departments; and the fact that people, in 
particular, accountants, prefer the private sector for employment, both because of 
more attractive remuneration packages and also because of the perception that jobs 
in the private sector are more prestigious.” 
 
If the reform is to happen, the finance function within the line ministries has to be 
strengthened, through the employment of suitably qualified staff.  
 
The interview data also showed that investment in an accounting and IT system is 
required if PBB is introduced, since the existing accounting and information system 
is incapable of allowing data manipulation for producing reports as required. The 
government is presently in the process of changing the current accounting system in 
view of its plans to implement accrual accounting. Thus, this hurdle is presently 
being addressed.  
 
5.5 Political Ability 
 
The findings suggest that within the Maltese scenario, there is a third enabler of 
radical change, being the political ability required to make the reform happen. As a 
result, the Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) framework could be augmented in terms 
of the intraorganisational dynamics comprised in the model, as set out in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Model for understanding organisational change (Adapted)  
Precipitating Enabling 
dynamics dynamics
MARKET 
CONTEXT 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
INTEREST 
DISSATISFACTION 
VALUE 
COMMITMENTS 
POWER 
DEPENDENCIES 
POLITICAL 
ABILITY 
CAPACITY    
FOR ACTION 
ORGANISATIONAL 
CHANGE 
CONTEXT CHANGE INTRAORGANISATIONAL 
 
Source: Greenwood & Hinings (1996, p. 1034). 
L. Ellul 
 
87  
The interview participants mentioned a number of political issues which could 
constrain the implementation of PBB, as summarised below: 
 
• Political interference in the running of government departments does not allow 
civil servants the freedom to restructure operations and work processes for the 
purpose of enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. In this respect, it was 
mentioned that top civil servants do not have a free hand to transfer people 
around even if it is believed that performance would be improved as a result of 
such transfer. 
 
• It is extremely difficult for government to shed any excess staff, in view of the 
heavily unionised environment in public sector employment and because of the 
political damage that government would suffer. This problem is very relevant, 
given that wages and salaries of government employees represent a significant 
portion of the ministries’ recurrent expenditure. 
 
• The financial plans and estimates prepared by the ministries as part of the budget 
process are sometimes overridden during the course of the year by a political 
decision. An example was cited in this regard of a programme which had been 
adequately provided for in the financial estimates, but which subsequently 
suffered a huge cost overrun, because of a decision taken by the Minister to open 
the programme to a wider audience. 
 
• There is the political risk of putting government’s effectiveness into question, 
should actual performance not reach the pre-set targets. This could also be used 
by the party in opposition to gain political advantage. 
 
A PBB system embraces the measurement of performance and linking the 
expenditure to the planned results and outcomes (Melkers and Willoughby, 1998). 
This requires shifting staff around activities, if necessary, and may also necessitate 
reducing the staff complement for certain programmes. Additionally, expenditures 
on programmes should be justified in terms of the expected results and should not 
normally exceed the budget allocation. 
 
In this respect, transferring people around or making staff redundant would be 
politically unpopular actions which would result in the loss of political support 
(translated into loss of votes during a general election) for the party in government. 
Conversely, widening the scope of an activity or programme, as mentioned above, 
would win votes for the governing party.  
 
In view of the above discussion, the following question needs to be answered: can 
the political forces prevalent in the Maltese context be addressed in order to enable 
radical change? 
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The issue of political interference arises when budget plans are overridden by 
political decisions. Issues of political sensitivity arise when actual results fall short of 
targets and are made public. Support from people at the top is fundamental to enable 
change to deal with these types of issues.  Radical change would only be possible if 
the people in positions of power support the new way of doing things and dedicate 
the required resources to drive the reform. Furthermore, better planning is called for 
to tackle the issue of plans being superseded by certain political decisions – there has 
to be the willpower from the top to turn down line ministries’ requests for funding 
which would not have been planned for in the budget (unless it is a matter of 
national or strategic importance). 
 
A large reduction in staff complement within government is highly unlikely in 
Malta, so this problem has to be mitigated through the application of the concept of 
natural attrition, where employees who leave employment, retire or die, would not be 
replaced. In other situations, staff mobility wold need to be improved, with excess 
employees in certain posts being moved to other roles which have a shortage of staff, 
if the skill set of such employees is compatible with the new role.  
 
Therefore, the political forces within the Maltese context could, to a certain extent, 
be controlled, thus, making radical change possible. This is a challenging endeavour, 
which requires effort, resources and championing from the top. If political ability is 
supported by a competitive (as is the case in Malta) or reformative pattern of value 
commitments, then radical change would be possible. 
 
5.6 Type of Performance Budgeting 
 
There was general agreement amongst the respondents that it is best to start off with 
presentational PBB, where PI is included in budget documents as background 
information for the purposes of accountability and it does not play a role in decision-
making (OECD, 2008). It has also been suggested that once the civil service and the 
politicians build up confidence in the new budgeting system, it would be advisable to 
move to performance-informed budgeting (Curristine et al., 2007), where the 
compiled PI is used for budget decision-making, but it does not determine the 
amount of resources allocated (OECD, 2008). There might be certain areas or sectors 
where it would be appropriate to introduce direct budgeting, such that the funding 
allocated would reflect the results attained – the feasibility of this has to be assessed 
during the system design stage. As discussed further on, the choice of the PBB 
system is a significant determinant of the type and pace of change embraced (radical 
versus convergent and evolutionary versus revolutionary). 
 
6. Conclusions and Reflections 
 
Institutionalisation can obstruct change because practices in an organisation become 
deeply embedded within that organisation, according to Argento and van Helden 
(2010). In line with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), a radical change to the existing 
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Maltese budgeting system could be problematic, due to the fact that the system is an 
institutionalised practice and thus, change could be resisted from the parties affected 
by the reform. Thus, the first question to address is the following: What type of 
organisational change is expected in the Maltese budgetary framework?   
 
In summary, two main groups of stakeholders can be distinguished with respect to 
their differing degrees of dissatisfaction with the current budgeting system. The first 
group, consisting of the majority of the interviewees, opined that the budgetary 
system needs to be reinvented. The second group, consisting of two top civil servants 
from the MOF, demonstrated a considerably lower degree of dissatisfaction with the 
existing system. The first group of stakeholders attributed the difficulties faced by 
government in making optimal budget allocation decisions to the existing budgeting 
system. A number of participants suggested that government should embrace a PBB 
system as an alternative template. As a result, a competitive pattern of value 
commitments prevails, whereby the first group of stakeholders have expressed their 
wish for the implementation of an alternative budgeting system, whilst the second 
group did not criticize the template-in-use.  
 
In line with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), in the case of a competitive 
commitment, radical change is possible if powerful people are supportive of the 
reform. The analysis concludes that there are diverging views vis-à-vis the reform, 
amidst the people holding positions of power within the Maltese public 
administration, with some of them being strongly in favour of the change and a few 
having some reservations. As regards the ability of moving from the current to the 
alternative template, there are some deficiencies in the competencies required to 
operate within the new system, which could be addressed through the recruitment of 
qualified personnel and through the engagement of consultants who have already 
been involved in the implementation of PBB systems in other countries. The findings 
have revealed a further enabling dynamic for radical change in the Maltese context, 
being the political ability to embark on the reform. It has been shown that this 
requires overcoming a number of barriers of a political nature. The analysis shows 
that this is not an easy feat, and would require considerable time, effort and 
resources, together with championing from the people at the top.  
 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the most significant impediment to radical change 
in the Maltese context is the political dimension. Consequently, if the reform is to go 
through, it has to be championed at the top, possibly by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister for Finance. There are a number of key persons in positions of power (as 
indicated above) who strongly advocate PBB. Furthermore, it is important to 
highlight that there are significant pressures for changing the traditional budgeting 
system given that, according to the interviewees, it is not serving as a tool for 
effective decision-making. This, coupled with the internal dynamics discussed 
above, could lead to a radical change.  
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A number of budgetary reforms have recently been initiated as part of the overall 
fiscal discipline process being carried out by the Maltese public administration, in an 
attempt to control the deficit and bring down government’s debt. Amongst others, 
three important reforms which might pave the way to the introduction of PBB 
include the launch of spending reviews to determine what outputs were delivered in 
respect of selected budget line items; the enactment of a Fiscal Responsibility Act 
which places the budget process under greater scrutiny and accountability and lays 
down more onerous reporting requirements (Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2014); and 
the publication of the ‘Implementation of the Budget’ document which reports on the 
performance of the ministries vis-à-vis the previous year’s budgetary measures 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2015).   
 
Secondly, what type of PBB (presentational, performance-informed and direct) 
should be adopted within the Maltese context and how does this impinge on the 
different levels of change (radical versus convergent change and evolutionary versus 
revolutionary change)? 
 
The empirical data indicates that reform implementation should kick off with 
presentational PBB and then, move towards performance-informed budgeting, once 
the civil servants and politicians build up confidence in the new system. 
Presentational PBB provides no linkage between PI and funding (OECD, 2007), with 
the purpose of this type of PBB being to enhance accountability rather than to 
influence the allocation of resources. As such, it can be argued that the adoption of 
presentational PBB does not constitute a radical change (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996) from the existing system, since PI is provided as background information in 
budget documents and decision-making is not affected. Should the reform process 
stop with the introduction of this type of PBB, there is the risk of fostering a 
symbolic rather than functional use of PI, in view of the focus placed on presenting 
PI in budget documents rather than on utilising such information to inform and affect 
allocative decision-making. 
 
Conversely, a performance-informed budgeting system makes use of PI in the 
budget decision-making process, even though the link between PI and funding is 
loose or indirect (OECD, 2007). In view of the fact that allocative decision-making 
is affected with this type of PBB, it is argued that the adoption of such a reform 
would represent a radical change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) from the existing 
line-item budgeting system. Clearly, direct PBB which involves allocating resources 
based on results achieved, would constitute a radical change from the existing line-
item budgeting system. However, this PBB type cannot be introduced across the 
board, since in certain sectors, it might be unfeasible to link underperformance to a 
reduction in the budget allocation in view of political, economic and social 
considerations, amongst others. Thus, it is advisable that direct PBB would only be 
considered for selected areas, after careful consideration of the ensuing implications. 
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Radical change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) can be both evolutionary and 
revolutionary, depending on the pace of change. As mentioned above, the empirical 
evidence has indicated the respondents’ preference to kick off the budgetary reform 
with presentational PBB and then, once the parties affected by the reform build up 
confidence in a performance measurement system, performance-informed budgeting 
would be introduced. This suggests an evolutionary (gradual) rather than a 
revolutionary change (1996), starting off with presentational PBB (which does not 
constitute a radical change), but then moving on to a performance-informed 
budgeting system and perhaps direct PBB in selected cases (both of which represent 
a radical change from the existing system). This proposed course of action also 
makes sense in view of the cultural change required in the civil service to embrace a 
performance based system and in view of the challenges that have to be addressed 
for the successful implementation of PBB. 
 
The Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model comprises internal or intraorganisational 
elements, which are classified into precipitating dynamics and enabling dynamics. 
The current model lists stakeholders’ dissatisfaction and value commitments as 
precipitating dynamics, and power dependencies and capacity for action as enabling 
dynamics. Within the Maltese scenario, a third enabler of radical change has been 
identified, being the political ability required to make the reform happen. Indeed, it 
has been determined that the potential lack of political ability to embark on the 
reform is perhaps the most significant impediment to radical change in the Maltese 
context. Political ability, supported by a competitive or reformative pattern of value 
commitments and backed by top people in positions of power, could lead to radical 
change. This finding is a valuable contribution to the existing body of knowledge, in 
the context of a small EU country. In this regard, the application of radical change 
dynamics in the context of the Maltese public sector, could be drawn upon by other 
small countries seeking to understand public financial management reforms. 
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